Conceptual relativism is a sort of relativity that will focus on the need for mediation of conceptual network, language, paradigms or other mental man-made apparatus in the process of understanding reality and interpretation of universe. According to conceptual relativists since conceptual apparatus and network playing mediatory role are multiple, various and immeasurable and cannot be judged true or false, so the different views of world and theories presented in variety of domain in terms conceptual designs, paradigms, and various linguistic terms enjoy the same degree of truth, truthfulness and justifiability.By examining exact definition of conceptual relativism and its main formulations, this article attempts to show the distinction between two domains of conceptual relativism and epistemic relativism and that one will face strong linguistic obstacles if he is going to bridge the former to the latter. Given the truth and validity of conceptual relativism, it never entails the relativity of truth and truthfulness.

The idea that science is objective, or able to achieve objectivity, is in large part responsible for the role that science plays within society. But what is objectivity? The idea of objectivity is ambiguous. This paper distinguishes between three basic forms of objectivity. The first form of objectivity is ontological objectivity: the world as it is in itself does not depend upon what we think about it; it is independent of human thought, language, conceptual activity or experience. The second form of objectivity is the objectivity of truth: truth does not depend upon what we believe or justifiably believe; truth depends upon the way reality itself is. The third form of objectivity is epistemic objectivity: this form of objectivity resides in the scientific method which ensures that subjective factors are excluded, and only epistemically relevant factors play a role in scientific inquiry. The paper considers two problems that arise for the notion of epistemic objectivity: the theory-dependence of observation and the variability of the methods of science. It is argued that the use of shared standard procedures ensures the objectivity of observation despite theory-dependence. It is argued that the variability of methods need not lead to an epistemic relativism about science. The paper concludes with the realist suggestion that the best explanation of the success of the sciences is that the methods employed in the sciences are highly reliable truth-conducive tools of inquiry. The objectivity of the methods of the sciences leads to the objective truth about the objective world.

'Post-truth' has become a buzzword for numerous current crises: the fragmentation of the media landscape, the ongoing debate about 'fake news', the loss of trust in science, etc. Although these crises take place in society, it is claimed that the roots of post-truth can be traced back to the history of philosophy. Occasionally, it is asserted that Karl Popper's critical rationalism gave rise to post-truth: His rejection of verificationism has limited truth claims in the realm of science. Given the absence of infallible evidence and certainty, critical rationalism calls for challenging scientific authority. I argue that post-truth is compatible with critical rationalism from an epistemological point of view, considering that both positions are critical of certainty. However, in critical rationalism, fallibilism, responsibility, and the idea of criticism are combined, and in this respect, it offers a possible way to overcome the problems that are associated with post-truth. This treatment of the problems of post-truth results from the recognition of moral responsibility to take action on the basis of a hypothesis that remains open to revision.

In the twentieth century, a variety of relativistic views have emerged in different fields. Anthropological and linguistic studies of some scientists such as Cyper and Whorf led to linguistic relativism. According to this view, not only languages have decisive roles in the formation of our thoughts and worldviews, but they are incommensurable and they cannot be translated to one another. In this paper, I seek to analyze relativism and its determinants in order to illustrate, first, that at what level, linguistic relativism enters, and what things are the ones that languages become their reference framework and relativity, and second, how strong and creidable this sort of relativism is-to see whether or not evidence and arguments for this view can drive home its claim. In this paper, I shall distinguish between linguistic relativism and linguistic determinism, showing that the weak thesis of linguistic determinism and the partial role of language in the facilitation of thought-and not in its determination and control-can be plausible.

Introduction: One of the most important issues in development of any scientific discipline including geomorphology is introduction of new viewpoints and special conceptualization. Introduction of relativism in philosophy, language and sociology has brought about deep evolutions in the epistemology of the research methodology in these sciences. Although this viewpoint was already introduced in geomorphology by the American scientist G. K. Gilbert one hundred and thirty years ago, temporal conditions did not let the development and understanding of the conceptions for others. Recognition of Gilbert’ s views and its comparison with relativism concepts in this age can familiarize us with Gilbert’ s thought and the evolutions it made in relativism concept. Besides, it can prevent us from considering Gilbert’ s relativism to be in parallel with many concepts introduced by others.....

Since the time of Plato, relativism has been attacked as a self-refuting theory. Today, there are two basic kinds of argument that are used to show that global relativism is logically incoherent: first, a direct descendent of the argument Plato uses against Protagoras, called the peritrope; and, second, a more recent argument that relativism leads to an infinite regress. Although some relativist theories may be formulated in such a way as to be susceptible to these arguments, there are other versions of relativism that are impervious to these charges of incoherence. First the arguments against relativism will be stated. Next, a radical form of global relativism with assessment sensitivity is introduced, RR. Finally, it is shown how RR can be defended against the challenges of the peritrope and the regress. No attempt is made to defend RR as a plausible theory; however, the usual attempts to show the logical incoherence of radical forms of global relativism fail.

In this article, the author deals with the critical study of Rorty and Gadamer's doctrines on truth through analyzing its undesirable epistemological and political consequences. Rorty denies truth and believes that it is merely the indicator of sentences specification. But Gadamer does not deny truth and believes it is as event of appearance which flourishes from within the dialogue and man enjoys the truth according to the tradition in which he has been, but in a limited, dynamic and historical way. Although Gadamer and Rorty's doctrines in the interpretation and admission of truth are different,the face similar epistemological and political consequences that are the opposite of what they want: epistemological relativism, irrationalism, denial of critical idea, refusal of reformism, refusal of dialogue, violence and putting at risk rational freedom.

By examining the different meanings of "essence" and "quiddity" in the thought of the Muslim philosophers, and by examining the important origins of Mula Sadra'a (transcendent) philosophy, this article will prove that the concepts of essence and quiddity are rejected in his philosophy and are considered as something conventional and as subjective constructs. So this line of thinking is nominalistic in this regard, and therefore is epistemologically a relativistic thought considering the knowledge of reality as something relative. In his philosophy, necessary and absolute knowledge of reality is impossible, and from the methodological viewpoint, this line of thought cannot be classified under rationalistic philosophy. Therefore, this kind of philosophy must rely on methods like intuition or experience.

One of the central notions in Thomas Kuhn’s thought is the notion of incommensurability. Generally, we can distinguish two kinds of incommensurability: methodological and semantic incommensurability. The methodological incommensurability is the thesis that the standards of theory appraisal are themselves theory-dependent. So, some kind of standard variance can be recognized at the level of theory appraisal. On the other hand, semantic incommensurability seems to imply semantic variation between theories or paradigms, regarding the terms occurring in them. These two kinds of dependencies have been employed in support of two forms of relativism: truth relativism and epistemic relativism. The main focus of this paper is on the possible relations that one can depict between incommensurability and these two kinds of relativism. First, I outline possible connections articulated by sufficient and necessary conditions. After that, I attempt to assess the viability of the resulting propositions.

Debate about moral relativism and moral absolutism is one of the most important and old subjects of philosophic deliberations in ethics; but the result of this discussion is not limited to ethics. The position a person takes on relativism or non-relativism of main values and criteria, affects his viewpoint, stance, social and legal position. In this article after articulating the related concepts, we revise each kind of moral relativism; and finally, we come up with the main reasons given for each one and evaluate them.